兰德智库《大国冲突》报告翻译 第六章中美低烈度冲突情景

　　In this chapter we explore how China and the United States could fight a war to decide the issue of global leadership through extensive low-intensity conflict. A distinctive feature of this scenario is the absence of direct conventional combat between Chinese and U.S. mili-tary forces. This emphasis on escalation control means that both sides would also avoid nuclear war and refrain from a mutually ruinous all-out war in cyberspace or outer space. Instead China would seek to seize international primacy through a military strategy that aimed to gradually diminish U.S. warfighting capacity and will to fight. Such a conflict could last many years and feature clashes and various combat operations in many parts of the world. The risk would remain high that such a low-intensity struggle for supremacy could escalate into high-intensity war. Chapter Seven will analyze the prospects of high-intensity war.

　　在这一章中，我们探讨美国和中国如何通过广泛的低烈度冲突来打一场决定全球领导权问题的战争，其显著特点是美国和中国军队之间没有传统意义上的直接交战——双方对战争升级之着力把控意味着彼此避免核战出现、包括在网络空间或外太空发生相互破坏的全面战争。而中国寻求逐步削弱美国军事战力和战斗意志之军事战略来夺取全球首要地位——这样的态势可能会持续很多年，并且伴随这在世界许多地方发生冲突和各种战事。但是，这种低烈度的争夺战升级为高烈度战争的风险仍然很大。所以，我们在本章之后的第七章再分析高烈度战争的情景。

　　In this chapter we first outline several key geopolitical assumptions to provide context for the scenario; this context helps frame key Chinese political and military decisions. We then describe what the national leadership’s directives to the PLA might look like in such a situa-tion, paying particular attention to distinctive features of China’s approach, to the extent we can plausibly posit them. We then analyze how the military might modify its mission, force development, and guidance on force employment to carry out a low-intensity war. With this material as context, we then sketch out a variety of conflict possibilities across different geo-graphic regions. We emphasize that these conflict possibilities should be viewed as illustra-tive examples based on the logic and assumptions of the scenario, not as predictions.

　　在本章中，我们首先概述了几个关键的地缘政治假设，以提供情景的背景；这种背景有助于构建中国的关键政治和军事决策。然后，我们描述了在这种情况下，国家领导人对解放军的指示可能是什么样子的，特别注意中国的方法的独特之处，只要我们能够合理地假设它们。然后我们分析军方如何修改其任务、部队发展和部队使用的指导，以进行低烈度的战争。以这些材料为背景，我们勾勒出不同地理区域的各种冲突可能性。我们强调，这些冲突可能性应被视为基于情景的逻辑和假设的说明性例子，而不是预测。

　　Geopolitical Assumptions

　　地缘政治假设

　　The description of a hostile rivalry outlined in Chapter Five provides the starting point for analyzing a scenario of extensive U.S.-China low-intensity conflict. These assumptions do not present the only way that the two countries could arrive at such a scenario, but they do offer a path based on historical patterns of past great power systemic conflict. To maximize the analytic value of the assumptions and minimize the hazard of attempting future predic-tion, we focus only on the most essential drivers while leaving aside speculation about spe-cific incidents, developments, and other details.

　　在前面第五章中，我们关于敌对关系的描述为分析美中广泛的低烈度冲突情景提供了一个起点，不过，这些假设并没有提出两国可能达到这种状态的唯一途径，但它们确实探究了基于过去大国系统冲突模式的路径。为了最大限度地提高假设的分析价值，并把预测未来的危险降到最低，我们只关注最基本的驱动因素，而不去猜测具体的事件、发展和其他细节。

　　To summarize the findings of Chapter Five, the geopolitical context is one in which both countries have entered a state of hostilities. That is to say, each nation has designated the other as an “enemy” state that it regards as having both the intent and ability to endan-ger its own basic security. Regardless of whether this entailed a formal declaration of war, both capitals would reorder their national and security strategies to prioritize the conflict. The decision would culminate years of escalating tension in which the two nations regu-larly feuded over a broad range of economic, political, security, technological, and other issues. Moreover, it would culminate trends in which the U.S.-China rivalry overlapped with rivalries and disputes involving other countries, some of which maintained or stepped up their own feuds with countries aligned with the rival great power. Following past prec-edent, the involvement of other countries would add to the intractability of escalating U.S.-China tension by providing a significant international constituency for the continua-tion of the conflict. This could in turn incentivize both capitals to exploit such multilateral feuds for advantage in their own struggles. In such a situation, multilateral organizations featuring both powers would likely have broken down due to gridlock, resulting in interna-tional inaction in the face of collective threats. Spreading international disorder could com-plicate the rivalry by introducing or aggravating multiple threats to international security. It could also elevate the stakes of the contest, since both sides would be incentivized to blame the other and possibly exploit some of the disorder to harm the interests of the other. This in turn would aggravate threat perceptions and encourage both capitals to drive even harder to achieve a decisive advantage over the other.

　　总结第五章可以发现，地缘政治背景是两国都进入了敌对状态。也就是说，彼此都把对方定为 "敌国"，认为对方有意图和能力危害自己的基本安全。因此，无论是否需要正式宣战，两个国家的政府均会重新调整国家和安全战略，以优先考虑这场确定冲突。这种决定将使多年来不断升级的紧张局势达到顶峰，两国在广泛的经济、政治、安全、技术和其他问题上经常发生争吵。此外，美中竞争与其他国家的竞争和争端重叠的趋势也将达到高潮，其中一些国家保持或加强了与敌对大国结盟的国家之间的争斗。按照以往的先例，其他国家的参与会使美中紧张局势的升级更加难以解决，因为它为冲突的持续提供了重要的国际支持。这反过来又会刺激两国的政府在自己的斗争中利用这种多边争斗来获取利益。在这种情况下，由两个大国组成的多边组织很可能会因为僵局而瓦解，导致国际社会在面对集体威胁时无所作为。蔓延的国际混乱可能会通过引入或加剧对国际安全的多重威胁而使对抗更加复杂。它还会提高竞争的利害关系，因为双方都会有动力去指责对方，并可能利用一些混乱来损害对方的利益。这反过来又会加重人们对威胁的看法，并鼓励双方的政府更加努力地争取对“敌国”的决定性优势。

　　As conflict begins, Washington and China could be expected to expand their defense buildups and intensify alliance-building activities. China might refrain from naming formal alliances out of political principle, but it would establish partnerships that offer similar secu-rity benefits. As in the two World Wars and the Cold War, countries and nonstate actors around the world would exploit the U.S.-China rivalry to achieve their own goals by appeal-ing to one side or the other for patronage. Other countries could choose to support the United States or China due to a desire to gain benefits by demonstrating loyalty to one side or the other, some sympathy or historic relationship with one of the two rivals, or some com-bination of the above. A series of serious militarized crises could accelerate all these trends. In such a volatile and unstable situation, even a relatively minor incident could be sufficient to tip the strained relationship past the breaking point, kicking off the low-intensity war. However, in this scenario both capitals decide to wage an indirect war. The main driver could be a fear of nuclear exchange, or it could be the fact that despite the intensifying hos-tilities both sides still depend on each other to a large extent for trade. Whatever the pre-cise reasons, each side chooses to overcome its adversary through a blend of asystemic warfor global primacy andinterventionsas the primary mode of waging low-intensity war (see Chapter Four). In many ways, the paradigm for this geopolitical situation would be something akin to the early decades of the Cold War, in which two rival powers carried out political mobilization, oversaw major military buildups, developed alliances, feuded over a broad range of issues. around the world, and competed for influence and partners. The United States and the Soviet Union also fought each other in proxy wars involving their allies and partners in many parts of the world but did not engage in direct conventional combat. A major difference, however, is the far narrower gap in national power between China and the United States than there was between the Soviet Union and the United States. The geographic scope of conflict could accordingly expand well beyond what it was during the Cold War. But, as in the Cold War case, the onset of hostilities would mark a critical turning point in the struggle for international primacy. Accordingly, the leadership of both countries would have a strong incentive to modify strategic goals and military strategies in light of the dramatic change in situation.

　　随着冲突的开始，可以预期华盛顿和北京将扩大其国防建设并加强建立联盟的活动。中国可能出于政治原则而避免命名正式联盟，但它会建立提供类似安全利益的伙伴关系。正如两次世界大战和冷战时期一样，世界各地的国家和非国家行为者将利用美中竞争来实现自己的目标，向其中一方寻求庇护。其他国家选择支持美国或中国的原因可能是希望通过对一方的忠诚来获得利益，也可能是对两个对手之一的同情或历史关系，或者是上述因素的某种组合。一系列严重的军事化危机会加速所有这些趋势。在这种动荡不安的情况下，即使是一个相对较小的事件，也足以使紧张的关系超过崩溃点，拉开低烈度战争的序幕。然而，在这种情况下，两个国家的政府都决定发动一场间接战争。主要的驱动力可能是对核冲突的恐惧，也可能是尽管敌对状态加剧，双方仍然在很大程度上相互依赖对方的贸易。不管是什么原因，每一方都会选择通过为争夺全球首要地位而进行的系统性战争和作为发动低烈度战争的主要模式的干预来战胜对手（见第四章）。在许多方面，这种地缘政治局势的范式类似于冷战早期的几十年，其中两个敌对大国进行了政治动员，监督了重大的军事建设，发展了联盟，在世界范围内就广泛的问题进行争斗争夺影响力和合作伙伴。美国和苏联还在涉及其在世界许多地方的盟友和伙伴的代理战争中相互争斗，但没有直接进行常规战斗。然而，一个主要的区别是，中国和美国之间的国力差距比苏联和美国之间的差距要小得多。冲突的地理范围可以相应地扩大，远远超过冷战时期的水平。但是，与冷战时期的情况一样，敌对行动的开始将标志着争夺国际首要地位的关键转折点。因此，两国的领导层将有强烈的动机根据形势的巨大变化来修改战略目标和军事战略。

　　China’s National Strategic Goals in a Low-Intensity Systemic War

　　中国在低烈度系统性战争中的国家战略目标

　　We assume that, consistent with the CCP’s focus over the past several decades, the central leadership would continue to regard China’s revitalization as a great power by midcentury, a goal labeled the “China Dream” by Xi Jinping, as the end state of its national strategy. Bei-jing’s adoption of aggressive strategies could be driven by the judgment that peaceful meth-ods of achieving the China Dream had become inadequate. For purposes of this analysis, we will assume that China has made substantial progress toward achieving regional primacy and even toward global leadership, even if it has not fully displaced the United States at either level. On the contrary, we will assume that the United States is strong enough to resist its supersession and that this resistance is a principal reason why China has decided it must resort to violence to impose its will on the United States.

　　我们认为，与中国共产党过去几十年的工作重点一致，中央领导层继续把本世纪中叶振兴中国之使命——即习近平提出的 "中国梦"，作为国家战略最高目标。北京之所以采取积极进取策略，可能是出于这样的判断：实现 "中国梦 "的和平方式也许不够充分（因为遭遇美国围堵——译者注）。在本分析中，我们假设中国在实现地区首要地位甚至全球领导地位方面取得了实质性进展，尽管它在这两个层面上都没有完全取代美国。相反，我们假设美国有足够的实力来抵制其取代（美国围堵中国——译者注），而这种抵制是中国决定必须诉诸武力抗拒美国的主要原因（中国在美国咄咄逼人地军事围堵下、比如屡屡抵近中国领空海域进行滋扰，甚至武力干预中国台湾等内政事务，导致中国被迫自卫——译者注）。

　　Regional and global primacywould be important to China, as it has been for the United States, for reasons of economic prosperity, security, prestige, and politics. But China does not need to dominate the Indo-Pacific in the manner that the United States has been able to do in the America. China is unlikely to completely subdue powerful states such as Japan and India. Nor has Beijing given any indication that it holds such ambitions. Rather, China seems intent on seeking to build stable, favorable relations with wealthy and powerful Asian countries along the periphery while aiming to establish a more dominant role in the developing coun-tries along BRI routes. Thus, by regional primacy we mean China’s leadership role principally in establishing client states in South, Southeast Asia and Central Asia, although it certainly hopes to exert greater influence in East and Northeast Asia as well.

　　出于经济繁荣、安全、威望和政治的原因，区域和全球的首要地位就像对美国一样、对中国也很重要。但中国不需要像美国主宰美洲那样主宰印度—太平洋地区，中国不太可能完全征服日本和印度这样的强国，北京也没有任何迹象表明有这样的野心。相反，中国似乎有意寻求与外围的富裕和强大亚洲国家建立稳定、互利的关系，同时力求在一带一路沿线的发展中国家发挥更多的主导作用。因此，我们所说的地区主导权是指中国主要在南亚、东南亚和中亚客户国中发挥领导作用，尽管中国当然也希望在东亚和东北亚发挥更大的影响力。

　　Economically, China as a global and regional leader would be best positioned to arrange and lead economic activity in a manner that privileged its own needs and those of its clients. Security-wise, a China that enjoyed global primacy might face balancing influences from rival states such as the United States, Japan, and others, but it would probably also gain much more support from countries around the world that sought the benefits of Chinese patronage. China would also be better positioned to manage flash points along its periphery with less fear of U.S. and foreign military intervention. Politically and in terms of prestige, a China that appeared close to eclipsing the United States as the world’s most powerful nation could enjoy a considerable boost in domestic and international support.

　　在经济上，中国作为全球和地区的领导者，最有能力以满足自己和客户的需求的方式安排和引领经济活动。在安全方面，享有全球首要地位的中国可能会面临来自美国、日本和其他国家等对手的平衡影响，但它也可能会从世界各地寻求中国支持的国家那里获得更多的拥护。中国也将更有能力处置周边地区的热点问题，而不必担心美国和外国的军事干预。在政治上和声望上，似乎接近于超越美国成为世界上最强大国家的中国可以在国内和国际上获得相当大的支持。

　　In accordance with this logic, we assume that Beijing has adjusted its national strategy to require defeat of U.S. power as a necessary condition for achieving the China Dream. Defeat of the United States is an ambitious national objective that needs to be more clearly defined. In this scenario, China has no ambition and no feasible way to contemplate conquest and occupation of the United States. Instead, we assume Beijing’s goal centers on the defeat of U.S. efforts to stymie China’s realization of its national revitalization goals. Beijing’s desired end state accepts the continuation of the United States as a nation, but in a much diminished and weakened condition. In effect, China’s end state would envision its ascent to a position of global preeminence and the concomitant downgrading of the status of the United States to that of a regional power in the Americas. The U.S. presence in the rest of the world would largely be on terms that China would regard as acceptable. China could in this situation hope to maintain a trading relationship, despite the indirect conflict, if tensions could be managed. In sum, we posit that the principal goal guiding the formulation and implementation of a war effort against the United States would be to weaken and diminish U.S. military and political power to such an extent that Washington could no longer seriously impede Beijing’s realization of national revitalization. At the same time, Chinese leaders in this scenario would aim to avoid a great power war, whose escalation could prove impossible to control and which would carry intolerably high risks of catastrophic war. If possible, China could also seek to maintain a trading relationship and some level of stable ties or even coop-eration on some shared threats with the United States, even as the two sides fought indi-rectly. Beijing’s desired end state would thus be one in which the United States adopts a position of subordination to Chinese power. Somewhat similar to Chinese descriptions of an ideal “new type of major power relationship,” the ideal end state for China would be a conclusion of peace on terms of nominal equality but de facto U.S. deference to China as the new global leading power.

　　根据这一逻辑，我们假设北京已经调整了国家战略，要求将打败美国力量作为实现中国梦的必要条件。打败美国是一个雄心勃勃的国家目标，需要更明确的界定。在这种情况下，中国没有野心，也没有可行的方法来考虑征服和占领美国。相反，我们假设北京的目标集中在击败美国阻碍中国实现其国家振兴目标的努力上。北京所期望的最终状态是接受美国作为一个国家继续存在，但在大大减少和削弱的条件下。实际上，中国的最终状态将设想其上升到全球领先的地位，同时将美国的地位降为美洲的区域性大国。美国在世界其他地区的存在主要以中国认为可以接受的条件进行。在这种情况下，尽管存在间接冲突，但如果紧张局势能够得到控制，中美仍有希望保持贸易关系。总之，我们认为，指导发展和实施针对美国的战争努力的主要目标是削弱和降低美国的军事和政治力量，使华盛顿不能再严重阻碍北京的国家振兴目标。同时，在这种情况下，中国领导人将致力于避免大国战争，因为战争的升级可能是无法控制的，并带来不可容忍的灾难性战争高风险。如果可能的话，中国也会寻求与美国保持贸易关系和某种程度的稳定，甚至在某些共同的威胁上进行合作——即使双方间接开战。因此，中国希望的最终状态是让美国采取服从于中国力量的立场。与中国对理想的 "新型大国关系 "的描述有些类似，中国理想的最终状态是在名义上平等的条件下实现和平——但实质是美国要服从中国这个新的全球主导力量。

　　The onset of indirect hostilities with the United States could be accompanied by exten-sive nonmilitary struggle and hostile policies. Given the two nations’ economic interde-pendence and shared involvement in multilateral institutions, as well as China’s current preference for waging its international struggles through nonmilitary means, the economic, diplomatic, and informational struggles would perhaps even be foremost. Paradoxically, it is possible that the belligerents could maintain some level of trade and investment, driven perhaps more out of necessity than anything else. However, the onset of hostilities with the United States would profoundly shape almost all domains of Chinese policy. For example, Chinese leaders would probably delay spending on various domestic programs in order to fund a robust military buildup to defeat U.S. power.

　　与美国的间接敌对行动之开始可能伴随着广泛的非军事斗争和敌对政策。鉴于两国在经济上的相互依赖和在多边机构中的共同参与，以及中国目前对通过非军事手段进行国际斗争的偏好，经济、外交和信息斗争甚至可能是重头戏。非常诡异地是，交战双方可能还会保持一定程度的贸易和投资——因为别无选择。然而，和美国开战将深刻影响中国政策的几乎所有领域。例如，中国领导人可能会推迟各种国内项目的支出，以便为强大的军事建设提供资金，从而击败美国力量。

　　The country already maintains a vast internal security apparatus, and a reduction in social spending to ameliorate demands for the citizens could mean that Beijing would probably have to further increase repression to ensure political stability. China’s foreign policy to support the realization of the China Dream would also likely change dramatically, with a more aggressive focus on demonizing the United States and rallying international supporters in a manner somewhat evocative of the polarizing politics of the Cold War. China could manipulate its long-standing for-eign policy prohibitions on unilateral military intervention to justify its reliance on indirect involvement in intrastate wars primarily through military aid and assistance. In ways that recall patterns in the Cold War, the PLA could in some cases find itself drawn more deeply into the conflicts of client states as part of a broader effort to weaken its rival’s credibility and prestige.

　　中国在国内安全设施方面投入巨大，并减少社会支出以提高公民的幸福指数，政府也积极着力维护社会稳定。中国有关实现中国梦的外交政策可能发生很大变化，并更加积极地专注于妖魔化美国（实际是揭露美国对中国的种种打压围堵行径——译者注），并以某种方式赢得国际支持者，这令人想起冷战时期的两极化政治。长期以来，中国反对单边军事干预之外交政策，并证明自己通过军火贸易和援助间接卷入他国国内战争的正当性(此为作者带节奏的描述、中国军火国际贸易属于市场行为，跟某国内战无关——译者注)。在某些情况下，解放军可能会发现自己更深地卷入了客户国的冲突，这跟冷战时期美苏阵营对峙情形相似——在更大范围和程度上努力削弱对手信誉和声望。

　　Given the decision to wage an indirect war and its own power projection limitations, China would have to pay particular attention to motivating client states to fight. Beijing has traditionally relied on a message of anti-imperialism and antimilitary intervention to rally international support against the West, and a similar message could underpin its effort to motivate clients to fight U.S.-backed forces. But clients might be motivated to support Chi-nese combat operations for other reasons. In the past World Wars and in the Cold War many countries sought to exploit their own local interstate rivalries and/or intrastate conflicts to advance their own goals by appealing to one side or the other for patronage. In World War I, for example, China and Japan joined the Allies in hopes of securing various benefits, including territory for Japan, at the expense of the Central Powers. Alternatively, clients could demonstrate support in hopes of maintaining good relations with a powerful China or in response to intense pressure from Beijing. In the case of World War II, Brazil furnished combat forces and many countries in Latin America sided with the United States against the Axis powers despite any grievance against them. These countries joined in part to maintain good relations with the United States and also partly in response to intense diplomatic pres-sure from Washington.

　　考虑到发动间接战争的决定以及自身投送力量的限制，中国不得不努力动员客户国参战。中国历来依靠反帝国主义和反军事干预来争取国际社会支持反击西方，同样，中国可能据此动员客户国家跟美国支持的军队作战。但客户国也可能出于其他原因而支持中国的作战行动。在过去的世界大战和冷战中，许多国家都试图利用当地国家间竞争和/或国内冲突，通过向一方或另一方求助来实现自己的目的。例如，在第一次世界大战中，中国和日本加入协约国是希望牺牲列强而获得各种利益，而日本战后获得领地之利益。另一种情况是，客户国因为希望与强大的中国保持良好关系而表示支持，或应对来自中国政府的巨大压力。在第二次世界大战中，巴西提供了作战部队，许多拉美国家也不管不顾地与美国站在一起对抗轴心国。这些国家的加入部分是为了与美国保持良好关系，部分也是为了应对来自华盛顿的强大外交压力。

　　But it is also possible that such a disparate collection of states with little ability to project force would not form a cohesive alliance. Rather, China could operate a loose-knit coali-tion in which countries shared little with one another beyond Chinese patronage and a gen-eral desire to redress historic wrongs. Chinese military coordination with its clients could be largely bilateral and transactional, based on Beijing’s judgment of how much the particular military aims of its clients supported the broader effort to diminish U.S power and prestige.

　　但是，对于这个武力投射能力有限的国家联盟而言，可能难以形成高度凝聚力。因此，中国可以运作一个相对松散的联盟，在这当中除了中国的庇护和纠正历史错误的普遍愿望外，各国之间几乎没有共同之处。中国与客户之间的军事协调在很大程度上可能是双边和交易性的，它基于一种积极判断：中国政府对客户的特定军事目标在多大程度上有助于削弱美国权力和威望。

　　Beijing might also try to build multilateral coalitions modeled on groups such as the SCO, but disunity, lack of consensus, and the limited power projection capabilities of most member states would severely constrain their value beyond propaganda. To compensate for their weaknesses, China might add paramilitary forces and security contractors to such coalitions.

　　中国政府还可能尝试以上合组织等为蓝本建立多边联盟，但缺乏团结、共识以及大多数成员国有限的力量投射能力将严重制约其宣传之外的价值。为弥补其不足，中国可能会在此类联盟中加入准军事部队和安全承包商。

　　In short, the most likely tool of Chinese overseas indirect combat power could center on bilateral patron- client ties. Current models of Chinese client-patron relations, as seen in Cam-bodia, suggest a model that could be expanded on in such a low-intensity conflict scenario.4 In this model China could rely on the provision of arms and benefits to elites in client states to support their conflicts against adversaries that had some form of U.S. backing in exchange for limited access on the part of the PLA. In some cases, Chinese military forces might need to intervene more directly to prop up a client regime, but this option is most plausible for coun-tries along China’s periphery. China might also devote resources to supporting proxy con-flicts or building influence in states supported by such a key partner state as Russia. In each situation, China would perhaps assess the relative advantage that could be gained through a more active involvement and weigh the feasibility of competing options before deciding on one approach. China would also face the risk that the client state could escalate a situation beyond Beijing’s expectations, resulting in a larger commitment that China would find dif-ficult to back out of.

　　简而言之，中国海外间接作战力量最有可能的工具可能是双边赞助人——客户关系。在这种模式下，中国可以依靠向客户国的精英提供武器和利益来支持他们与对手的冲突，而对手则以借助美国某种形式支持来应对解放军的有限介入。在某些情况下，中国军队可能需要进行更直接的干预，以扶持客户政权。这一方案对于中国周边国家来说最为可行。中国也可能投入资源支持代理冲突，或在俄罗斯这样的重要伙伴国支持的国家建立影响力。在每种情况下，中国或许都会评估通过更积极的介入所能获得的相对优势，并在决定采取哪种方式之前权衡各种方案的可行性。中国还将面临这样的风险，即客户国可能会将局势升级到超出中国政府预期的程度，从而导致中国难以退出的更大承诺。

　　TABLE 6.1

　　图6.1

　　A U.S.-China Low-Intensity War Scenario: China’s National Goals

　　美中低烈度战争情景：中国的国家目标

　　These national strategic goals would in turn frame and inform how Beijing might direct the PLA to carry out its operations against the United States. Several other assumptions are worth noting. First, we assume that the CCP remains in power throughout this time frame, as there is little evidence to suggest the party’s rule is in any danger. We assume that the lead-ership in China seeks to avoid engaging in a devastating great power war that might escalate to nuclear annihilation.

　　中国这些国家战略目标反过来又会为中国政府如何指导解放军开展针对美国的行动提供框架和信息。还有几个假设值得注意。首先，我们假设中国共产党在这一时期内始终执政——因为几乎没有证据表明该党的统治面临任何动摇。我们同样假设中国的领导层寻求避免参与一场可能升级为核毁灭的灾难性大国战争。

　　Even though we aim to paint a picture of a more antagonistic and conflict-ridden U.S.-China competition, we assume that the Chinese government hopes to avoid escalation to high-intensity war; yet, despite its intentions, the risk of unintended esca-lation remains high throughout this scenario. The trends noted in Chapter Two also apply or, more likely, have accelerated. In particular, the gap in national power between China and the United States has further narrowed, the world order remains fragmented, problems of resource competition continue to be pervasive, and an increasingly multipolar world features shifting partnerships and alliances. The military trends of new technologies and modes of conflict also apply.

　　这些国家战略目标将反过来框定并告知北京如何指导解放军执行针对美国的行动。这里有几个假设值得注意。首先，我们假设中国共产党始终处于领导地位——几乎没有证据表明该党的执政面临任何危机。同时，我们假设中国领导层寻求避免卷入升级为核大战的毁灭性大国战争——尽管我们的目标是描绘一个更加对立和冲突不断的美中竞争局面，我们依然假定中国政府希望避免升级为高烈度战争；然而，尽管中国政府有这样的意图，但意外冲突的风险仍然很高。第二章中提到的趋势也适用、或者更有可能是加速了。特别是中美之间的国力差距进一步缩小，世界秩序仍然支离破碎，资源竞争问题依然司空见惯，日益多极化的世界的特点是伙伴关系和联盟不断变化。新技术和冲突模式的军事趋势也适用。

　　Chinese and Adversary National Interests

　　中国和竞争国家利益

　　While China might adopt an overall posture of hostilities with the United States, the decision to engage in particular clashes and conflicts would likely be driven by careful consideration of the potential benefits to be gained from each individual situation. To represent these sorts of considerations, we specify possible interests of both China and those of its adversaries. The national interests of China also includes those of client countries—that is, nations that depend on Chinese power for protection and benefits, which they receive in exchange for deference to Beijing on a broad range of policy issues. Chinese national policy today does not consider the role of client states, but the incentive to do so would become difficult to avoid in a systemic global conflict with the United States. China’s adversaries would principally include the United States but could include others, such as Japan or other U.S. allies and part-ners. We use China’s fairly inclusive typology of “core interests” as a starting point for this analysis. Accordingly, Chinese considerations for the use of force would seek either to defend Chinese interests or to attack the interests of its adversaries, while downgrading the impor-tance of operations that did not aim to achieve either sets of objectives. For Chinese national interests, there are a number of appropriate categories.

　　虽然中国可能会采取与美国敌对的总体态势（在美国遏制中国的前提下——译者注），但在决定参与特定冲突和矛盾时，很可能会仔细考虑从各种情况中获得的潜在利益。为了体现这些考虑因素，我们具体说明了中国及其对手的各种利益。中国的国家利益还包括附属国的利益——即依靠中国力量获得保护并获益的国家，它们通过在广泛的政策问题上服从中国政府来换取这些利益。今天，中国的国家政策并不考虑客户国的作用，但在与美国的系统性全球冲突中，这样做的动机将难以避免。中国的对手主要包括美国，但也可能包括其他国家，如日本或美国的其他盟国和合作伙伴。我们将中国相当包容的 "核心利益 "类型作为分析的出发点。因此，中国在考虑使用武力时，要么寻求捍卫中国的利益，要么寻求打击对手的利益，除此之外的其它东西不具有重要性。就中国的国家利益而言，有许多适当的类别。

　　Basic national security.This is the essential security of the state and society, damage to which could threaten instability or the survival of the nation. In the present scenario this may also be partially extended to the basic national security of Chinese client states.

　　国家基本安全。这是指国家和社会的基本安全，如果受到破坏，可能会危及国家的稳定或存亡。在目前的情况下，这也可以部分延伸到中国附属国的基本国家安全。

　　CCP rule and the socialist system.The CCP has a natural interest in perpetuating its rule and controlling any threats to it. In the present scenario this may also mean support-ing the perpetuation of friendly regimes in client states and the control of threats to those regimes.

　　中国共产党的领导和社会主义制度。中国共产党地坚强领导并防范对国家安全的任何威胁。在当前形势下，这可能也意味着要支持友好国家的长治久安，并防范对这些国家的威胁。

　　Sovereignty and territory.All Chinese claimed territories are involved, including disputed ones in the maritime regions, Taiwan, and land border areas. Chinese sovereignty in cyber-space and protection of relevant space-based assets also fall into this category. In the present scenario, the sovereignty and territory of key client states could be additional considerations.

　　主权和领土。所有中国主张拥有的领土都涉及其中，包括有争议的海域、台湾（作者这里混淆黑白、台湾本身就是中国不可分割的一部分，而不是“中国主张的领土”——译者注）和陆地边境地区。中国在网络空间的主权和相关天基资产的保护也属于这一范畴。在当前情况下，主要客户国的主权和领土可能是额外的考虑因素。

　　Developmental interests.This refers primarily to all economic-related assets, resources, markets, and shipping lanes abroad, as these are the vital inputs to the economy. In the pres-ent scenario, these interests this may to some extent incorporate the economic interests of key client states, so long as these are congruent with China’s.

　　发展利益。这主要是指所有与经济相关的海外资产、资源、市场和航道，因为这些都是经济要素的可观投入。在当前情况下，这些利益在一定程度上可能包括主要客户国的经济利益，只要这些利益与中国的利益一致。

　　China’s credibility and prestige as a great power.Although not formally listed as one of China’s core interests, a China that has neared global primacy would have a strong incen-tive to uphold its credibility and prestige as a leading power. The desire to maintain its status could motivate China to commit more resources to ensure victory in a distant conflict than might otherwise appear justified.

　　中国作为大国的信誉和威望。虽然没有被正式列为中国的核心利益之一，但已接近全球霸主地位的中国将有强烈的动机维护其作为领袖大国的信誉和威望。维护自身地位的愿望可能会促使中国投入更多资源，以确保在一场遥远的冲突中取得胜利，而这在其他情况下似乎是不合理的。

　　While the PLA may carry out missions to protect and defend its interests and, to a lesser extent, those of its clients, it would also have the mission to weaken and downgrade the will and capacity of the United States and its allies. China could be expected to direct offensive operations against the interests of the United States and other antagonists of China, which, in such a polarized environment, would very likely seek some level of cooperation with the United States. Since this is a scenario focused on low-intensity warfare, Chinese leaders would support client states to attack the adversary counterpart’s interests. In some cases, PLA forces could engage directly against countries backed by the United States (see Table 6.2). The deci-sion to consider the interests of client states as meriting Chinese military aid would mark a striking departure from current practice. The decision might enable China to strengthen its ability to maintain and sustain coalitions abroad, but would also raise risks of entanglement and unwanted escalation of conflict in distant locales involving PLA forces.

　　虽然解放军可能会执行保护和捍卫自身利益的任务，并在一定程度上保护和捍卫其客户的利益，但它同时也肩负着削弱和降低美国及其盟国的意志和能力的使命。可以预见的是，中国将针对美国和其他敌国的利益采取进攻行动、在这种两极分化的环境下，中国很可能会寻求与美国进行某种程度的合作。由于这是一种以低烈度战争为重点的情景，中国领导人将支持客户国攻击对手。在某些情况下，解放军部队可能直接与美国支持的国家交战（见表 6.2），把客户国的利益视为中国军事援助的理由，这与当前的做法大相径庭。这一决定可能会使中国加强其在海外维护和维持联盟的能力，但同时也会增加在遥远的地方与解放军部队发生纠葛和不必要的冲突升级的风险。

　　TABLE 6.2（略）

　　China’s Military Strategy in a Low-Intensity Conflict Scenario

　　低烈度冲突情景下的中国军事战略

　　Because our analysis is focused on the possibilities of military conflict, we will examine more closely the PLA’s low-intensity strategy to defeat U.S. power. In this section we explore how Chinese leaders might define the nation’s principal threats and the military’s missions and objectives in light of the conflict. We also explore how leaders might refine guidance on building and operating military force.

　　由于我们的分析重点是军事冲突的可能性，因此我们更仔细地研究解放军打败美国的低烈度战略。在本节中，我们探讨中国领导人如何根据冲突情况确定国家的主要威胁以及军队的任务和目标。我们还探讨中国领导人如何完善军事力量建设和运作的指导方针。

　　Principal Threats

　　主要威胁

　　In a situation featuring systemic conflict with the United States, the threat posed by the United States would become a top priority. Owing to the severity of the danger, this would probably result in the downgrading of other threats as lower priorities. However, we assume that Beijing is unlikely to compromise on its core interests. Given the tension between com-peting objectives, we assume that China would opt to defer resolution of some issues, at least until after it has successfully overcome the U.S. threat. Until China achieved a decisive advan-tage over the United States, Beijing would continue to prioritize management of key dispute issues over their immediate resolution. This does not mean that China would take a passive posture regarding flash points such as Taiwan. On the contrary, these festering issues could become the new front lines of low-intensity warfare and a useful means for China to stage demonstrations of its strength and U.S. weakness. Occasional kinetic strikes or operations designed to demonstrate the limits of U.S. security assurances are also possible. China and the United States could escalate the frequency and scope of indirect conflicts through cyber, paramilitary, and other forces, a possibility explored further below.

　　在美中发生系统性冲突的情况下，美国构成的威胁成为重中之重。由于这个危险的严重性，其他各种威胁都降下为次要等级。然而，在我们看来中国政府不太可能在核心利益上妥协。鉴于两个竞争目标之间的紧张关系，我们假定中国会选择推迟解决某些问题（比如台湾问题——译者注），至少是在成功克服美国威胁之后。在中国获得对美国的决定性优势之前，中国政府将继续优先处理关键争端问题，而不是立即解决这些问题。当然，这并不意味着中国会在台湾等热点问题上采取被动姿态。相反，这些不断发酵的问题可能会成为低烈度战争的新前线，成为中国展示自身实力有效手段并反衬美国的弱点。如果可能，中国会发起偶尔动能打击行动以暴露美国安全保证局限性的。此外，中国和美国可能通过网络、准军事和其他力量升级间接冲突的频率和范围，下文将进一步探讨这种可能性。

　　‘ As indirect U.S.-China conflict breaks out between China and the United States, other Asian countries would be motivated to start picking sides to protect their own interests. Longtime rivals of China, such as India and Japan, would probably choose to cooperate with the United States for fear that a victorious China would next seek to subordinate its Asian neighbors. Beijing would thus have to prepare for contingencies on multiple fronts. Following the pattern of multilateralization of conflict noted in Chapter Five, other countries could seek to exploit opportunities arising from the conflict by aligning with the United States or with China. They might carry out limited military actions for their own national purposes, result-ing in the eruption of parallel and overlapping conflicts involving a large number of belliger-ents. In particular, the growing trend of intrastate conflict in past decades could open many opportunities for indirect U.S.-China conflict. China could find itself coping with civil wars involving its client states or exploiting opportunities for mischief in the partner nations of the United States. Alternatively, both the Chinese and U.S. governments might support nonstate actors in countries experiencing intrastate war.

　　随着美中之间爆发间接的冲突，其他亚洲国家也会开始选边站、以保护自己的利益。中国的长期对手，如印度和日本，很可能会选择与美国合作，因为他们担心胜利后的中国接下来会试图征服亚洲邻国。因此，中国政府必须为多方面的突发事件做好准备。根据第五章所述的冲突多边化模式，其他国家可能会通过与美国或中国结盟来利用冲突带来的获益机会。它们可能会出于本国目的采取有限的军事行动，这导致爆发涉及众多交战方的平行和重叠冲突。尤其是过去几十年来有的国家国内冲突不断加剧的趋势可能会为美中间接冲突带来许多机会。中国可能会发现自己正在应对涉及其客户国的内战，或利用美国伙伴国的机会进行捣乱。或者，中美两国政府都可能会支持正在经历内战的国家的非国家行为体。

　　China would have to ensure that sufficient forces were available to cope with each of these threats. So would the United States, which in its weakened state might find itself facing newly emerging threats on its periphery. In a reprise of Cold War–era politics, the United States could find itself confronted by hostile rebel groups or states backed by Chinese arms and money in Europe, Latin America, or elsewhere. Longtime antagonists such as Cuba or Venezuela could host Chinese military forces and perhaps support nonstate actors in coun-tries aligned with the United States. Countries in these regions might experience national breakdown, which could in turn exacerbate intrastate conflict—again with potential Chinese involvement. Similarly, Washington could find itself funding and supporting friendly gov-ernments besieged by insurgencies and rebel groups backed by Beijing in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere along BRI routes. The point of China’s involvement in low-intensity, indirect war efforts around the world would be to distract the United States and attrit its resources and will to persist through its involvement in numerous conflicts.

　　中国必须确保有足够的力量来应对这些威胁，美国也是如此——它在衰弱的状态下可能会发现自己面临着新出现的周边威胁。冷战时期的政治重现，令美国可能会发现自己在欧洲、拉丁美洲或其他地区面临由中国武器和资金支持的敌对反叛组织或国家。古巴或委内瑞拉等长期敌对国家可能会接纳中国军队，或许还会支持与美国结盟国家的非国家行为体（反政府武装之类——译者注）。这些地区的国家可能会出现政权崩溃，这反过来又会加剧国内冲突——中国也有可能参与其中。同样，在印度洋——太平洋地区和 "一带一路"沿线的其他地区，华盛顿可能会资助和支援受到中国政府支持的叛乱和反叛组织围困的友好政府。中国在世界各地参与低烈度、间接战争的目的是分散美国的注意力，消耗其资源和意志，使其深陷诸多冲突泥潭。

　　U.S. allies in Asia, Europe, or the Middle East might also call for military assistance to deal with threats specific to their situations. China could exploit feuds and conflicts between European countries to drive them farther apart and weaken them further. For example, the fractures and persistent divisions in the Balkan states could also provide opportunities for China to back insurgencies or support clients engaged in their own military conflicts with their neighbors. Again, instances of national breakdown could open opportunities for China to back rebel groups against European- and U.S.-supported rebel groups. As another example, Saudi Arabia and its Sunni allies might similarly demand U.S. military support to cope with a militarily aggressive Iran backed by Chinese funding and arms. To maintain the support of its allies and partners in the broader struggle with Beijing, Washington could find itself under immense pressure to respond to such demands for military involvement around the world.

　　美国在亚洲、欧洲或中东的盟国也可能要求军事援助以应威胁。中国可能会利用欧洲国家之间的恩怨和冲突，使它们更加疏远，从而进一步削弱它们的实力。例如，巴尔干半岛国家的分裂甚至长期分裂也可能为中国提供机会——支持叛乱分子或支持与邻国发生军事冲突的客户。同样，国家政权崩溃也会为中国提供机会，支持反叛组织对抗欧洲和美国支持的反叛组织。再比如，沙特阿拉伯及其逊尼派盟国可能同样要求美国提供军事支持，以应对由中国资金和武器支持的伊朗的军事侵略（不过现在通过中国斡旋、沙伊和好共同对美不待见——译者注）。为了在与中国政府的更广泛斗争中保持盟友和伙伴的支持，华盛顿可能会发现自己面临巨大的压力，必须对世界各地的军事介入要求做出回应。

　　At the same time, nontraditional threats would likely persist and complicate the situ-ation. Even as they managed low-intensity conflicts against one another, both China and the United States would still need to cope with nonwar threats, such as regional instabil-ity, nuclear proliferation, insurgencies, state collapse, terrorism, natural disasters, and other dangers. All these competing threats and drivers could overlap and exacerbate the traditional threat posed by the clashing coalitions. Paradoxically, however, given the strains on the Chi-nese and U.S. militaries that could threaten to overwhelm their ability to respond, these other threats could add incentives to control escalation.

　　与此同时，非传统威胁可能会持续存在，并使局势复杂化。即使中美两国在处理彼此间低烈度冲突的同时，仍需应对非战争威胁，如地区不稳定、核扩散、叛乱、国家政权崩溃、恐怖主义、自然灾害和其他危险。所有这些相互竞争的威胁和驱动因素都可能相互叠加，加剧冲突联盟带来的传统威胁。然而，矛盾的是，鉴于中美两军面临的压力可能会使其应对能力不堪重负，这些其它威胁可能会增加控制冲突升级的动力。

　　A China that had moved closer to a position of regional primacy and international lead-ership would face a strong incentive to counter threats posed to the interests of key part-ners and to the global economy. To retain the loyalty of client states, China might begin to more highly value threats to key client states along BRI routes. For example, China could list Indian aggression against Pakistan as a threat to China’s interests and more directly aid its partner in relevant contingencies, perhaps by more actively supporting rebel groups in India or deploying specialized PLA units to aid Pakistan. To bolster its own international cred-ibility and prestige, China could also seek to expand its international influence—in part by assuming greater responsibility for protecting vital global shipping lanes and tackling other transnational threats. These multidirectional threats, and the persistent challenge of main-taining a vast domestic internal security apparatus, could further strain the ability of the PLA’s resources and add another incentive to maintain a low-intensity approach to war with the United States (see Table 6.3).

　　一个更接近于地区首要地位和国际领导地位的中国，将产生强烈的动机祛除对主要伙伴国利益和全球经济构成的威胁。为了留住客户国的忠诚，中国可能会开始更加重视 一带一路沿线主要客户国所面临的威胁。例如，中国可以将印度对巴基斯坦的侵略列为对中国利益的威胁，并在相关突发事件中更直接地援助伙伴国，或许可以更积极地支持印度的反叛组织，或部署专门的解放军部队援助巴基斯坦。为了提高自身的国际信誉和声望，中国还可以寻求扩大其国际影响力——部分方式是在保护全球重要航道和应对其它跨国威胁方面承担更大的责任。这些多方位的威胁，以及维持庞大的国内安全机构所面临的持续挑战，可能会进一步削弱解放军的资源能力，并促使其在可能爆发的美中战争中尽力控制在低烈度状态。（见表 6.3）。

　　TABLE 6.3

　　Chinese Threat Prioritization in a Low-Intensity War Scenario

　　中国在低烈度战争情景下的威胁主次排序

　　Military Missions and Objectives

　　军事任务和目标

　　As noted in Chapter Three, China’s leadership has upheld the framework of the “historic mis-sion” to define the PLA’s role in national strategy, albeit modified to emphasize the quality of strategic support for each mission. The modification to focus on strategic support empha-sizes the current national strategy’s focus on achieving goals principally through peaceful methods. For the military, this elevates in importance the responsibilities of deterrence and peacetime-shaping activities.

　　如本报告第三章所述，中国领导层坚持以 "历史性使命 "框架来界定解放军在国家战略中的角色，尽管这一框架已被修改为强调为各项任务提供战略支持的质量，这体现了提供战略支持是当前国家战略的重点——即主要通过和平方式实现目标。对军队而言，这提升了威慑和塑造和平时期活动的重要性。

　　Modified for an era of low-intensity war with the United States, the missions could carry points of continuity and change. The first mission to support the CCP’s rule would likely remain in place. It could, however, carry a corollary directive for the PLA to more aggres-sively support whole-of-government efforts to undermine enemies of the CCP. This might entail covert operations to encourage social and political division in the United States and its allies. The second mission of protecting sovereignty and territory could probably be modified to direct the PLA to also help protect the sovereignty and territory of key client-allies along BRI routes. China might also direct the PLA to carry out offensive operations that encour-age challenges to the authority of U.S. and allied governments in their respective territories and regions. As China’s overseas interests grew in importance, the central leadership could direct the military to step up efforts to protect overseas interests, an imperative reflected in the third mission. This might entail defensive operations to protect infrastructure, citizens,and economic interests in countries located along BRI routes.

　　The interests of client states could rise in importance, motivating Beijing to undertake military operations and activities to support them. Doing so could also entail offensive missions to weaken and damage the interests of the United States and aligned forces positioned to threaten or damage BRI-related infrastructure. An example might be cyberoperations to damage competitor networks. The fourth mission, that of essentially shaping a favorable security environment, could also see a dramatic expansion. China’s prestige and credibility could loom larger in considerations of Chinese involvement in various conflict situations, since perceptions of Chinese superior-ity and success would be more likely to bolster Beijing’s efforts to win international support. Related defensive strategies could call on the PLA to backstop client regimes and strengthen a Chinese-led international security order characterized by multilateral organizations that operate principally along routes, such as the SCO. Offensive missions might entail opera-tions to target and imperil U.S. partner countries and governments as part of a broader effort to demonstrate U.S. weakness and undermine the appeal of U.S. international leadership. The PLA might also support attacks by client militaries against high-profile U.S. military platforms such as stealth aircraft or aircraft carriers as part of a broader effort to diminish U.S. prestige (see Table 6.4).

　　在美中进行低烈度战争的时期，解放军的这些任务经过修改，可能具有有连续性和变化。第一项任务是拥护中国共产党的领导，并且坚持不变。不过，这可能会让解放军应更积极地支持政府的工作，以削弱中共的敌人。这可能需要采取秘密行动来鼓励美国及其盟国的社会和政治分裂。第二项任务是保护主权和领土，也许可以修改为指示解放军也帮助保护一带一路沿线主要盟友的主权和领土。中国还可能指示解放军开展进攻行动，以挑战美国和盟国政府在其各自领土和地区的权威。随着中国海外利益的重要性不断增加，中央领导层可能会指示军队加大保护海外利益的力度，这也是第三项任务所反映的当务之急。这可能需要采取防御行动，保护一带一路沿线国家的基础设施、公民和经济利益。

　　客户国利益的重要性可能会上升，促使中国政府采取军事行动和活动来支持这些国家。这样做还可能需要执行进攻任务，以削弱和瓦解美国敌对行动，包括打击对“一带一路”相关基础设施构成威胁或破坏的美国盟军。例如，破坏竞争对手互联网运用的网络行动。第四项任务，即从根本上塑造一个有利的安全环境，并产生积极效果。中国的威望和信誉可能会在中国参与各种冲突局势的考虑中占据更重要的位置，因为中国的优势和成功更有可能帮助中国政府赢得国际支持。相关的防御战略可能要求解放军支持客户政权，并加强由中国主导的国际安全秩序，其特点是多边组织主要沿着一带一路沿线运作，如上海合作组织。作为展示美国弱点和削弱美国国际领导力的更广泛努力的一部分，进攻性任务可能包括针对和威胁美国伙伴国家和政府的行动。作为削弱美国威信的更广泛努力的一部分，解放军还可能支持客户军队攻击隐形飞机或航空母舰等高知名度的美国军事平台（见表 6.4略——译者）。

　　For China, the goal of the low-intensity conflict would be to diminish and discredit the United States as a rival leader and undermine the nation’s ability to deny China’s ascent as an international leader. At the same, Beijing would be worried about driving Washington to such a desperate point that it escalates the war. Accordingly, China might seek to balance opera-tions and activities that weaken U.S. power with restraint from the most aggressive measures that could provoke a ruinous cyberspace, nuclear, outer space, or conventional war. These cross-cutting incentives could add further motivation for China to favor indirect methods of fighting U.S. power. While China might prefer to have clients do most of the fighting, small numbers of PLA forces could become involved in relevant combat operations.

　　对中国来说，低烈度冲突的目的是削弱和诋毁美国作为对手领导者的声誉，抵消美国敌视中国崛起成为世界领袖的做派。与此同时，中国政府也会担心把华盛顿逼到走投无路的地步导致战争升级。因此，中国可能会寻求在削弱美国的各种尝试与可能引发网络空间、核、外太空或常规战争最激进措施之间保持平衡。这些交叉激励措施可能会进一步促使中国倾向于采用间接方式对抗美国。虽然中国可能更倾向于让客户伙伴进行大部分战斗，但少量解放军部队可能会参与相关作战行动。

　　Force Development

　　军力发展

　　In terms of force development, years of escalating tensions and the shock of several serious military crises provide a strong incentive for senior leaders in the United States and China to step up a military buildup aimed primarily at the other country. The formal designation of the other country as an enemy state would accelerate this trend. But the preference for indirect conflict could significantly affect funding priorities. A full analysis of how China might revise its military modernization program in the light of a more hostile rivalry with the United States lies outside the bounds of this report, but we do suggest several strategic options that could be most relevant to potential conflict scenarios. In particular, we judge that even in a low-intensity conflict scenario, the PLA would probably still maintain its focus on outmatching the U.S. military in the quality of its weapons and equipment for deter-rence purposes and to retain the option of escalating the conflict. Thus, in this scenario we assume that China continues to invest in high-end capabilities, such as hypersonic weap-ons and medium- and long-range missiles, and enabling capabilities, such as space-based and electronic warfare, to deter and defeat U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific, especially within the first and second island chains. At the same time, to prevail in low-intensity conflict, China could increase investments in the cyberoperations and special operations domains, as well as gray zone capabilities such as paramilitary maritime forces and air support that could be deployed below the threshold of conflict. Since client states would bear the brunt of most fighting, Beijing might also direct defense industries to significantly expand pro-duction of low-cost but capable weapons and platforms to share with client states located along BRI routes, and it might invest in providing cybersecurity capabilities and training to client states. China would also need to improve coordination between the PLA and civilian organizations to support indirect, low-intensity conflict. Below, we briefly review possible changes in the PLA’s force development in this low-intensity conflict scenario. Given the cost of military development and expected slower growth for both countries in the coming decades, both could face constraints on their ability to ramp up defense spending. The possi-bility that some sort of trade relationship might continue despite the indirect conflict could to some extent mitigate the reductions in economic growth, but a world featuring hostilities between the two largest economies would very likely result in considerable disruption to trade and investment.

　　在军力发展方面，多年来不断升级的紧张局势和几次严重军事危机的冲击，为中美两国高层领导人加强主要瞄准对手国家的军事集结提供了强大动力。正式指定对方为敌国将加速这一趋势。但是，对间接冲突的偏好可能会极大地影响资金筹措优先顺序。全面分析中国如何在与美国更加敌对的情况下修改其军事现代化计划超出了本报告的范围，但我们确实提出了几种可能与潜在冲突情景最为相关的战略选择。特别是，我们判断，即使在低烈度冲突的情况下，解放军可能仍会继续注重在武器装备质量上超越美军，以达到威慑目的，并保留冲突升级的选择。因此，在这种情况下，我们假设中国继续投资于高端能力，如高超音速武器和中远程导弹，以及使能技术能力，如天基和电子战，从而威慑和击败在亚太地区、特别是在第一和第二岛链内的美军。同时，为了在低烈度冲突中取得胜利，中国可能会增加对网络作战和特种作战领域的投资，以及对灰色地带能力的投资，如准军事海上力量和空中支援，这些能力可以部署在冲突门槛以下。由于大部分战斗都将由客户国首当其冲，中国政府还可能指导国防工业大幅扩大生产低成本但有能力的武器和平台，跟一带一路沿线客户国分享，并可能投资客户国提供网络安全能力和培训。中国还需要加强解放军与民间组织之间的协调，以支持间接的低烈度冲突。下面，我们将简要回顾在这种低烈度冲突情景下解放军军力发展的可能变化。考虑到军事发展的成本以及中美两国在未来几十年的经济增长预期放缓，两国增加国防开支的能力都可能面临限制。尽管存在间接冲突，但某种贸易关系可能会继续下去，这在一定程度上可以缓解经济增长的下降，但如果世界上最大的两个经济体之间发生敌对行动，很可能会对贸易和投资造成相当大的干扰。

　　Missile forces.To deter the United States, we assume that the PLA increases its inven-tory of long-range strike weapons—in particular, hypersonic glide missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, intermediate-range missiles, and medium-range missiles. The PLA Rocket Force could increase its inventory of nuclear warheads to bolster deterrence. China could also be expected to expand its inventory of missile defense capabilities to counter U.S. long-range precision strike systems. As a trade-off, it might slow down production of short-range ballistic missiles due to their ample inventory and the priority of fighting U.S. power around the world over the immediate resolution of the Taiwan dispute and other disputes. The reli-ance on PGMs could be attractive to China for many reasons, but it would carry its own risks. Use of standoff strike could increase the risk of civilian casualties, for which China could be blamed. To mitigate this potential blowback, Chinese forces could be expected to step up information operations and propaganda to suppress such reports or deflect blame.

　　导弹部队。为了威慑美国，我们假定解放军会增加远程打击武器的研发，尤其是高超音速滑翔导弹、洲际弹道导弹、中程导弹和近程导弹。解放军火箭军可能会增加核弹头库存，以增强威慑力。预计中国还将扩大导弹防御系统的库存，以对抗美国的远程精确打击。作为得失权衡，中国可能会放慢短程弹道导弹的生产速度，因为其库存充足，而且与美国在全球范围内的实力对抗优先于解决台湾争端和其他争端。出于多种原因，对精确制导弹药的需求可能对中国颇有吸引力，但使用远距离打击可能会增加平民伤亡的风险，而中国也许因此受到指责——为了减少这种潜在的反作用力，中国军队可能会加强信息行动和宣传，以压制此类报道或转移视线。

　　Cybersecurity forces.In this scenario the PLA has a strong incentive to significantly increase cybersecurity units for the purposes of improving the cyber defense of China and key client states. Cybersecurity units come at relatively low cost. The PLA could expand its capabilities to carry out offensive operations that target the networks of the U.S. military and those of key U.S. allies and partners. China could also expand its financing and support for proxy cybersecurity groups in other countries, such as Russia, to carry out cyberattacks on U.S. and allied networks. It has already used some of these tactics through collaboration with the Chinese Ministry of State Security and affiliated advanced persistent threat groups that conduct cyberespionage at the behest of the ministry.

　　网络安全部队。在前述情景下，解放军更有强烈的动机大幅增加网络安全部队，以提高中国和主要客户国的网络防御能力。网络安全部队的成本相对较低，解放军可以扩大其能力，针对美军及美国主要盟友和合作伙伴的网络开展进攻行动。中国还可以扩大对俄罗斯等其他国家代理网络安全组织的资助和支持，对美国和盟国的网络进行网络攻击。中国已经通过与中国国家安全部及附属高级持续性威慑组织合作，使用了其中的一些策略，这些组织在中国国家安全部的统领下开展网络间谍活动。

　　Outer space and C4ISR.With hostile operations potentially expanding around the world, the PLA would have a strong incentive to upgrade and improve its ability to carry out surveillance, communication, and reconnaissance around the world. Space-based and unmanned assets could be key to those missions and might accordingly see expansions in capability. Replicating a method that would likely characterize many Chinese efforts, civil-ian entities could augment military capabilities. For example, Chinese civilian government ministries could step up their direct support for military missions. China could also capital-ize on previous efforts to develop information technology, communications, and outer space infrastructure in its client states and persuade their governments to share C4ISR capabilities and expand access for Chinese military units. Although the PLA might maintain offensive space-based and counterspace capabilities, the low-intensity nature of the war would pro-vide a strong incentive to refrain from escalation to a high-intensity war involving space-based assets.

　　外层空间与指挥、控制、通信、计算机、情报及监视与侦察系统。随着敌对行动有可能在全球范围内扩大，解放军将有强烈的动机升级和改进其在全球范围内执行监视、通信和侦察的能力。天基和无人资产可能是执行这些任务的关键，因此可能会相应地扩大其能力。与中国的许多努力一样，民间实体也可以增强军事能力。例如，中国政府的文职部门可以加强对军事任务的直接支持。中国还可以利用此前在其客户国发展信息技术、通信和外层空间基础设施的努力，说服这些国家的政府共享指挥、控制、通信、计算机、情报及监视与侦察系统，并扩大中国军事部队的使用范围。尽管解放军可能会保持进攻性的天基和反空间能力，但战争的低烈度性质将有力地促使其避免升级为涉及天基资产的高烈度战争。

　　The PLA Army.The conventional forces of the PLA Army (PLAA) might slow the pace of modernization to help pay for upgrades in the other services and branches. Defense indus-tries that support the PLAA could ramp up production of small arms, armor, artillery, heli-copters, and other equipment for use by client military forces. PLAA experts and advisers could play a key role in helping client militaries fight effectively with Chinese equipment. Major combat units facing potential contingencies near the Indian border or Taiwan or facing other potential enemy forces would retain priority for the modernization of weapons and equipment, however.

　　中国人民解放军陆军。中国人民解放军陆军（PLAA）的常规部队可能会放慢现代化步伐，以省出供其他军兵种装备升级的费用。为陆军提供支持的国防工业企业同样可以增加小型武器、装甲、火炮、直升机和其他装备的生产，供客户军队使用。中国陆军的专家和顾问可以在帮助客户军队有效使用中国装备方面发挥关键作用。然而，在印度边境或台湾附近面临潜在突发事件或面临其他潜在敌军的主要作战部队将保留武器装备现代化的优先待遇。

　　The PLA Air Force.To support low-intensity war, the PLA Air Force could expand its planned inventory of long-range transports—namely, the Y-20—and supporting special mis-sion aircraft. In order to support overseas combat missions, expanding the ranks of long-distance bombers and refueling tankers could be a top priority. Long-range bombers could provide valuable strike support to distant client militaries engaged with U.S.-backed forces. To continue to deter potential escalation into conventional war, the PLA Air Force could maintain a strong inventory of advanced fighter aircraft, although the pace of constructing high-priced fifth-generation aircraft such as the J-20 and J-35 could slow in order to free up resources for other efforts.

　　解放军空军。为支持低烈度战争，解放军空军可扩充其计划中的远程运输机（即运—20）和配套的特种侦察机。为了支持海外作战任务，扩大远程轰炸机和加油机的数量可能是重中之重。远程轰炸机可为跟美国支持部队交战的远方客户军队提供宝贵打击支持。为了继续遏制潜在升级成常规战争，解放军空军可以保持强大的先进战斗机库存，尽管建造高昂的第五代飞机（如歼—20 和歼—35）的步伐可能会放缓，以便腾出资源用于其他工作。

　　The PLA Navy.By 2049, the PLA Navy will have likely upgraded and modernized its sur-face ships to augment shipborne air defense systems and increased the size and capability of its submarine fleet. To better protect merchant shipping and deter potential attacks through the South China Sea, from the second island chain, and in the Indian Ocean, the PLA might develop teams of surface action groups consisting of destroyers, submarines, replenishment vessels, and other combat vessels capable of routinely carrying out SLOC protection missions. The PLA Navy’s current counterpiracy task force offers a potential template for the type of force it could deploy in a future maritime crisis. The task force comprises a landing vessel, a missile frigate, and a supply ship, with approximately 700 PLA Navy officers manning the vessels. In addition, the task force has deployed the missile frigateAnyang, which also has long-range alert and air defense capabilities.

　　中国人民解放军海军。到2049 年，海军将有可能对其水面舰艇进行升级和现代化改造，以增强舰载防空系统，并扩大其潜艇舰队的规模和能力。为了更好地保护商船，阻止通过南海、从第二岛链和印度洋发起的潜在攻击，解放军可能会发展由驱逐舰、潜艇、补给舰和其他能执行海上交通线保护任务的作战舰艇组成的水面行动编队。中国海军目前的反海盗特遣舰队为今后海上危机部署何种舰队类型提供了潜在模板。特遣舰队由一艘登陆舰、一艘导弹护卫舰和一艘补给舰组成，约有 700 名解放军海军官兵在舰艇上值勤。此外，特遣舰队还部署了导弹护卫舰"安阳"号，该舰也具备远程警戒和防空能力。

　　The PLA Navy Marine Corps.The PLA is already on pace to expand the size of its Marine Corps to 100,000 troops. In this scenario, a modest increase in the number and prioritization of newer arms and equipment could enable the PLA Navy Marine Corps to more effectively carry out combat missions abroad, including an expanded capacity for amphibious opera-tions. As with the PLA itself, the PLA Marines could serve in military advisory roles with counterparts in client militaries.

　　解放军海军陆战队。海军陆战队已按计划扩编至 10 万人。在这种情况下，适度增加新式武器装备的数量和优先级，可使解放军海军陆战队更有效地执行海外作战任务，包括扩大两栖作战能力。与中国人民解放军本身一样，海军陆战队也可与客户军队的对等部队一起发挥军事顾问作用。

　　Special forces (all services).Chinese special forces could experience expansions in numbers and receive higher priority for modernization and expansion of weapons and equipment. They could carry out a variety of sabotage, reconnaissance, and other elite light infantry mis-sions to support client military forces around the world. The PLA might seek to improve the ability of special forces to serve in advisory and assistance missions, although this remains a key gap in its present capabilities.

　　特种部队（所有军种）。中国特种部队的人数可能会增加，并在武器装备的现代化和扩充方面获得更高的优先待遇。他们可以执行各种破坏、侦察和其他精锐轻步兵任务，为世界各地的客户军队提供支持。解放军可能会寻求提高特种部队执行咨询和援助任务的能力，尽管这仍然是其现有能力中的一个关键缺憾。

　　Bases and facilities.Given a higher likelihood of hostilities with U.S.-backed forces beyond the first island chain, the PLA would have a strong incentive to expand access for combat forces abroad. This would include both direct involvement in the form of PLA troops and indirect involvement in the form of Chinese donations of military aid and equipment.

　　基地和设施。鉴于在第一岛链之外跟美国支持的武装力量遭遇敌对行动的可能性较高，解放军将有强烈的动机扩大海外作战部队的准入。这既包括解放军部队的直接参与，也包括中国捐赠军事援助和装备的间接参与。

　　We assume that China will have successfully leveraged its economic prowess to gain access in key locations along BRI routes, especially in Southeast Asia. For the purposes of this analysis, we assume that PLA forces have some limited access in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. In Central Asia, PAP and PLA special forces could gain access to facilities to support limited combat operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

　　我们假定，中国将成功利用其经济实力在一带一路沿线的关键地点，尤其是东南亚地区获得准入。在本报告分析中，我们假定解放军部队可以有限地进入孟加拉国、柬埔寨、缅甸、斯里兰卡和泰国。在中亚，人民行动党和解放军特种部队可以进入一些设施，以支持在阿富汗和巴基斯坦的有限作战行动。

　　In the Middle East, China could have gained access and built some facilities for visiting troops in Iran. Africa could see the expansion of facilities and access in key energy-producing partner states such as Angola and Sudan. To support military operations in the Atlantic and the Americas, China might also seek a naval base on the eastern coast of Africa. All these regions could also experience greater Chinese indirect involvement in the form of donated military aid and equipment, especially in intrastate conflicts featuring opposing factions backed by Beijing and Washington.

　　在中东，中国可以为访问伊朗的部队获得准入并建造一些设施。在非洲，中国可能会在安哥拉和苏丹等主要能源生产伙伴国扩大设施和通道。为支持大西洋和美洲的军事行动，中国还可能寻求在非洲东海岸建立海军基地。在所有这些地区，中国还可能以捐赠军事援助和装备的形式更多地间接参与其中，尤其是在北京和华盛顿支持的对立派别的国内冲突中。

　　China could also post military advisers and technical experts in client states in eastern Europe or in the Balkan states. The Arctic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea could see regu-lar patrols of major PLA Navy combatants, which could occasionally provide offshore sup-port to Chinese -backed forces fighting inland. China’s success in establishing the Djibouti base could lead to its expansion to host larger combat formations, which could be deployed to support clients in Africa and perhaps the Middle East. In the Caribbean and Latin Amer-ica, China would in this scenario gain expanded military access and some sort of support facilities in such partner states as Argentina, Cuba, or Venezuela, mostly in the form of temporary hosting of visiting military aircraft and ships. But Chinese military advisers and experts could augment donating alarms and equipment throughout Latin America, espe-cially in those countries experiencing intrastate conflict between Chinese- and U.S.-backed factions.

　　中国还可以在东欧或巴尔干国家的客户国派驻军事顾问和技术专家。中国人民解放军海军的主要作战舰艇可以定期巡逻北冰洋和地中海，并不时为中国支持的内陆作战部队提供近海支援。中国成功建立吉布提基地后，可能会扩大其规模，以容纳更大规模的战斗编队，这些编队可能会被部署到非洲，也可能部署到中东，为客户提供支持。在加勒比海和拉美地区，中国将在阿根廷、古巴或委内瑞拉等伙伴国获得扩大的军事准入和某种支持设施，主要形式是临时接待来访的军机和军舰。但是，中国的军事顾问和专家可以在整个拉美地区，特别是在中国和美国支持的派别之间发生内部冲突的国家，加强警戒和装备的捐赠。

　　Force Employment

　　武力使用

　　A low-intensity conflict with the United States would likely spur Chinese leaders to rethink many of their long-standing guiding principles regarding the use of force. While we do not know exactly how the guidance might change, we can hypothesize some possible modifica-tions to current PLA guidance to better suit the Chinese war aims and strategic objectives outlined in this scenario.

　　与美国的低烈度冲突可能会促使中国领导人重新思考他们长期以来在使用武力方面的许多指导原则。虽然我们并不清楚这些原则可能会发生怎样的变化，但我们可以假设解放军目前的指导原则会有一些修改，以更好地适应在这种情况下的战争目的和战略目标。

　　Chinese leaders in a situation of conflict with the United States would, by definition, permit more aggressive operations, including offensive operations against the interests of the United States and its allies and partners. But the struggle for international leadership and influence could dramatically affect how the PLA contemplates combat operations and its approach to risk and escalation. Sensitivities to the PLA’s persistent vulnerabilities, weak-nesses, and political imperatives could encourage China to favor distinctive ways of conduct-ing combat operations. In particular, the PLA is likely to remain relatively inexperienced entering a low-intensity war against U.S. forces. Even if we grant that the PLA might have clashed with neighboring countries in a handful of conventional fights, this remains a rela-tively small base of experience compared with that of the U.S. military. Moreover, we assume that the CCP and the PLA have not fully overcome the problems of weak administrative enforcement, a political preference for centralized control, emphasis on party loyalty, rule by the individual rather than law, and pervasive corruption. The military vulnerabilities of inad-equate logistics infrastructure, while perhaps somewhat mitigated by the conclusion of access agreements with client states, could also impose an important constraint on PLA planners. Adding to these concerns are the political considerations that Chinese leaders could retain in their pursuit of global leadership. Since Beijing hopes to build its base of power among devel-oping countries, it would face a strong motivation to limit the appearance of imperial occupa-tion in other countries. However, China’s inexperience with leading international coalitions raises a high likelihood that Beijing and PLA forces would poorly understand the conditions on the ground in distant intrastate conflicts or proxy wars involving Chinese-backed forces. The risk of Chinese miscalculation and misjudgment for such fights could be significant.

　　根据定义，在与美国发生冲突的情况下，中国领导人将允许采取更具侵略性的行动，包括针对美国及其盟友和合作伙伴利益的进攻行动。但是，争夺国际领导权和影响力的斗争可能会极大地影响解放军考虑作战行动的方式及其应对风险和事态升级的方法。对解放军长期存在的弱点、薄弱环节和政治需要的敏感性可能会促使中国倾向于采用独特的作战方式。特别是，解放军在与美军进行低烈度战争时可能仍然相对缺乏经验。即使我们承认解放军可能在少数常规战斗中与邻国发生过冲突，但与美军相比，其经验基础仍然非常薄弱。此外，我们假定中国共产党和中国人民解放军尚未完全克服行政执法不力、政治上选择中央集权控制、强调对党忠诚、个人集权而非法律规范以及腐败盛行等问题。后勤基础设施不完备所带来的军事隐患，虽然可以通过与客户国签订准入协议得到一定程度的缓解，但也会对解放军的规划者造成重要制约。除了这些担忧之外，中国领导人在追求全球领导地位的过程中可能还会保留一些政治考量。由于中国政府希望在发展中国家建立自己的权力基础，因此有强烈的动机限制在其他国家出现帝国主义占领。然而，由于中国缺乏领导国际联盟的经验，因此，北京和解放军部队很有可能对涉及中国支持部队的遥远国内冲突或代理战争的实地情况了解甚少。 为此，中国在此类战争中出现误判和判断失误的风险可能很大。

　　All these factors would provide a strong incentive for Chinese leaders to remain cautious about how they employ PLA forces abroad and to push client states to do most of the fighting where possible, perhaps operating at most in a manner of a poorly integrated, loose coali-tion. In most operations outside Asia the PLA footprint could be relatively modest, featur-ing a handful of bases. In most partner nations the PLA presence could be limited to mili-tary advisers, technical experts to support arms transfers, and small teams of PLA specialists to carry out intelligence and reconnaissance, cybersecurity, and other specialized missions. Unsure of the PLA’s ability to fight at long range in a truly integrated, joint fashion, forward-deployed combat forces could rely on single-service-led missions. The CCP’s preference for centralized control could also incentivize the PLA to rely heavily on technology, such as PGMs, AI-enabled sensors and weapons, and computer-enabled decisionmaking, which would reduce the need for delegating command authority and also avoid the potential embar-rassment of poor battlefield performance by inadequately prepared joint forces.

　　所有这些因素都将促使中国领导人对如何在海外使用军力保持谨慎，并在可能的情况下推动其客户国承担大部分作战任务，也许最多只是以整合不佳的松散联盟的方式开展行动。在亚洲以外的大多数行动中，解放军的足迹可能相对较小，只有少数几个基地。在大多数伙伴国，解放军的存在可能仅限于军事顾问、支持武器转让的技术专家，以及执行情报侦察、网络安全和其他特殊任务的解放军专家小组。由于不确定解放军是否有能力以真正一体化的联合方式进行远距离作战，前沿部署的作战部队可能会依赖单一军种主导的任务。中国倾向于集中控制，这也会促使解放军大力依赖技术，如精确制导武器、人工智能传感器和武器以及计算机决策，从而减少下放指挥权的必要性，也避免了联合部队因准备不足而导致战场表现不佳的尴尬局面。

　　The PLA would likely continue to adhere to the principles of active defense as guides to the employment of military force. But, consistent with past practice, the meaning of the principles would be adjusted to serve the political needs of the conflict. There are certain key principles that the central leadership could provide to guide military operations, as noted in the following paragraphs.

　　解放军可能会继续坚持积极防御原则，把其作为使用军事力量的指导方针。但按照以往的惯例，这些原则的含义将根据冲突的政治需要进行调整。如下文所述，中央领导层可提供某些关键原则来指导军事行动。

　　Ensure that military operations serve political goals.Consistent with past practice, the PLA would, in this scenario, emphasize its allegiance and deference to the party’s leadership and political goals for conflict. The diplomatic, information, economic, and technological aspects of the U.S.-China rivalry are the primary means of struggle. Military operations would play a critical but supporting role. Accordingly, the PLA would emphasize that military operations should not derail the nonmilitary efforts. For similar reasons, it would remain imperative that the PLA maintain escalation control and avoid provoking a broader conventional or nuclear war if at all possible. Chinese military writings on “war control” already strongly emphasize the imperative of ensuring political control of all military efforts and that military activities remain subordinate and supportive of political goals. These imperatives and principles would become just as important or more so in a world featuring extensive low-intensity and indirect conflict. A hallmark of this conflict would therefore be the extensive use of propaganda, infor-mation operations, “legal warfare,” and psychological operations in the leadup to the war to shore up domestic and international support and demoralize and undermine the United States.

　　确保军事行动服务于政治目标。按照以往的惯例，在这种情况下，解放军会强调其效忠和服从党的领导，以及冲突的政治目标。中美竞争的外交、信息、经济和技术方面是主要的斗争手段。军事行动将发挥关键但辅助的作用。因此，解放军将强调军事行动不应破坏非军事努力。出于类似原因，中国人民解放军必须保持对战争升级的控制，尽可能避免引发更广泛的常规战争或核战争。中国关于 "战争控制"的军事著作已经大力强调，必须确保对所有军事行动的政治控制，军事活动必须服从和支持政治目标。在广泛存在低烈度间接冲突的世界中，这些必要条件和原则将变得同样重要，甚至更加重要。因此，这种冲突的一个特点就是在战争准备阶段广泛使用宣传、信息行动、"合法战争 "和心理战，以巩固国内和国际支持，打击和削弱美国的士气。

　　Seize and maintain themoral, legal, and political high ground.The PLA has long valued the political dimensions of conflict and would likely do so in any U.S.-China conflict. As part of a broader struggle for political mastery, Chinese military operations involving the United States could pay close attention to the moral, legal, and political aspects of conflict. Chinese leaders might direct the PLA to avoid moves that appear overly aggressive and to pursue options that put the United States on the political defensive. To compensate for the

　　vulner-ability of its interests abroad, for example, China might deliberately choose to locate its over-seas assets in densely populated areas or rely on civilian transports with passengers to ship some equipment. China would in turn trumpet the civilian casualties that would inevitably arise from strikes against relevant military assets. At the same time, China’s government and military could carry out extensive efforts to legitimize and normalize PLA operations in the same area. Chinese military forces could be directed to operate in a manner that advances China’s vision of multilateral security based on Chinese political principles and ideals, such as a BRI-related multilateral security organization, even if relevant operations achieve little beyond advancing Chinese propaganda.

　　抢占并保持道德、法律和政治制高点。长期以来，解放军一直重视冲突的政治层面，在涉及所有美中冲突中也可能如此。作为争夺政治主导权广泛斗争的一部分，中国涉及美国的军事行动可能会密切关注冲突的道德、法律和政治方面。中国领导人可能会指示解放军避免采取看似过于咄咄逼人的举动，并采取让美国处于政治守势的方案。例如，为了弥补其海外利益的脆弱性，中国可能会有意选择将其海外资产安置在人口稠密地区，或依靠载客的民用运输机运送一些装备。反过来，中国也会大肆宣扬打击相关军事资产必然造成平民伤亡。与此同时，中国政府和军方可能会在同一地区开展大量工作，使解放军的行动合法化和正常化。中国军方可以指导军队推进基于政治原则和理想的多边安全愿景的方式开展行动，例如与一带一路相关的多边安全组织，哪怕相关行动除了推进中国宣传之外收效甚微。

　　Employ asymmetric means where possible.As part of the Maoist principle “You fight your way, I fight my way,” the PLA could be directed to seek asymmetric and cost-imposing strate-gies that minimize risks of escalation or embarrassing battlefield defeats. This principle could reinforce the PLA’s apprehension over engaging U.S. joint forces in a symmetrical manner. Instead the PLA could prefer long-range strikes by PGMs, attacks by unmanned systems, and cyberoperations. This could also mean generous Chinese support for simply equipped guerilla forces and other nonstate actors in third-party countries that fought against the United States.

　　尽可能采用不对称手段。作为毛泽东思想"你打你的，我打我的 "原则的一部分，解放军可能寻求非对称和“成本强加战略”，以最大限度地降低战事升级或战场惨败的风险。这一原则可能会加深解放军对以对称方式与美国联合部队交战的担忧。

　　相反，解放军可能更倾向于使用精确制导武器进行远程打击、使用无人系统进行攻击以及开展网络行动。这也可能意味着中国会慷慨支持第三方国家中装备简单的游击队和其他非国家行为者与美国作战。

　　Carefully control military actions and minimize escalation risks.Consistent with a strong emphasis on “war control” and related concepts, PLA forces might be directed to carefully manage the use of military operations and activities to ensure alignment with political goals. In situations featuring conflict with U.S.-backed forces, the PLA could prioritize operations with paramilitary and nonmilitary forces, such as intelligence and law enforcement assets, to advance Chinese interests where possible. Indirect conflict via partner host nation forces, paramilitary forces, and defense contractors would be prioritized over direct PLA engage-ment. But Beijing would restrict direct combat between PLA and U.S. forces without central leadership approval, though the risk of unintended escalation would be high for many con-flict situations. Major conventional combat forces would thus probably remain on high alert and at a high state of readiness in the event of escalation to major war.

　　谨慎控制军事行动，最大限度降低升级风险。根据对"战争控制 "和相关概念的高度重视，解放军部队可能会被指示谨慎管理军事行动和活动的使用，以确保与政治目标保持一致。在与美国支持的部队发生冲突的情况下，解放军可以优先使用准军事和非军事力量（如情报和执法资产）开展行动，在可能的情况下扩展中国的影响。通过东道国伙伴部队、准军事部队和国防承包商进行的间接冲突将优先于解放军的直接交战。但中国政府会限制解放军在未经中央领导批准的情况下与美军直接交战，尽管在许多冲突情况下意外升级的风险很高。因此，在冲突升级为大规模战争的情况下，常规作战部队可能会保持高度警戒和高度戒备状态。

　　Employ systems- of-systems doctrines in combat.Consistent with current PLA warfighting concepts, troops in this scenario might also prepare for battle guided by doctrines such as intelligentized warfare and systems-of-systems warfare, which seek rapid dominance in all domains to prevail on the battlefield by attacking and degrading enemy systems. Yet it is pos-sible that only a minority of elite PLA units would be fully trained and prepared to execute such missions, and these might be located principally on the mainland in a defensive posture. PLA forces that engage with U.S.-backed proxy forces might operate with less advanced forces and accordingly favor the methods of long-range attacks. However, difficulties in integrating client militaries that fight in simpler ways could also result in the PLA focusing on support functions such as ISR and long-range fire support.

　　在战斗中采用整体的系统理论。与解放军当前的作战理念一致，在美中冲突可能爆发的前提下，中国军队也可能在智能化战争和整体的系统战争等理论指导下备战，通过攻击和削弱敌方系统，寻求在所有领域的更多优势，从而在战场上取得胜利。但是，可能只有少数解放军精锐部队经过全面训练并做好执行此类任务的准备，而且这些部队可能主要部署在大陆，处于防御态势。与美国支持的代理部队交战的解放军部队可能使用次先进的部队，因此更倾向于远程攻击的方法。然而，整合困难作战方式较为简单的客户军队也可能导致解放军专注于可消耗性情报、监视和侦察和远程火力支援等辅助功能。

　　These admittedly speculative guiding principles provide a sense of how central leaders might seek to manage and control the role of military forces in a comprehensive, whole-of-government struggle for supremacy against the United States. To achieve political goals, the PLA would be directed to focus on a wide spectrum of military operations and activities, of which combat would be only one part. Combat operations would be strictly controlled and carried out in a manner that reflects the central leadership’s sensitivity to the political, legal, and moral features of any confrontation involving U.S.-backed forces. While Beijing might practice restraint in any situation involving U.S. military forces, it would keep the possibility of expansion to higher-end conflict open both to deter the United States and to maintain flexible options for any contingency. When considering options, PLA leaders might consider a gradu-ated approach, starting with the least lethal and nonmilitary forces. Where possible, Chinese leaders might prefer to empower and assist partner host nations to carry out any combat operations in their own country, with PLA forces playing at most an indirect, supporting role. Sensitivity to the political optics of Chinese military operations abroad might also incentiv-ize Beijing to organize coalitions, including some key client states for operations against any U.S.-backed forces. For example, PLA military advisers could help facilitate intelligence collec-tion and support for host nation military forces that target nonstate actors possibly backed by the United States. Chinese civilian technicians could at the same time help host nation military units operate unmanned platforms to carry out strikes or reconnaissance. Chinese govern-ment officials and contractors could also oversee the transfer of arms and training to employ the weapons effectively. Security for Chinese personnel and key assets could be provided by host nation units augmented by armed, nonuniformed defense contractors from China.

　　本报告对于中国军方战争指导原则无疑是推测性的，但却让我们了解到中央领导人可能会如何设法管理和控制军队在一场全国动员的全面抗美斗争中的作用。为了实现政治目标，解放军将受命集中精力开展一系列广泛的军事行动和活动，而作战只是其中的一部分。作战行动将受到严格控制，其实施方式将反映出中央领导层对任何涉及美国支持部队的对抗的政治、法律和道德特点的敏感性。虽然中国政府可能会在任何涉及美国军队的情况下保持克制，但同时也会有向更高端冲突扩展的可能性，以威慑美国，并为任何突发事件保持灵活的选择。在考虑各种方案时，解放军领导人可能会考虑采取渐进式方法，从杀伤力最小的非军事部队开始。在可能的情况下，中国领导人可能更倾向于授权并协助伙伴东道国在本国开展任何作战行动，而解放军部队最多只能发挥间接的辅助作用。对中国海外军事行动政治影响的敏感性也可能促使中国政府组织联盟，包括一些重要的客户国，以打击任何美国支持的势力。例如，中国人民解放军的军事顾问可以帮助促进情报合作，支持东道国军队打击可能得到美国支持的非国家行为体。同时，中国的民间技术人员可以帮助东道国军事部队操作无人平台，实施打击或侦察。中国政府官员和承包商还可以监督武器转让和有效使用武器的培训。中国人员和关键资产的安全保障可由东道国部队提供，并由来自中国的武装、非军警国防承包商予以加强。

　　Implications

　　影响

　　In summary, we assess a U.S.-China low-intensity war to be a long-term effort featuring proxy conflict and possibly direct interventions across much of the world. Fought primarily by the militaries of client states or favored rebel groups, as well as paramilitary and defense contractors, these conflicts could be waged as part of intrastate or interstate conflicts. PLA involvement would consist primarily of support to these combat forces and take the form of ISR and long-range fire support. The conflicts would most likely occur along the BRI routes that China has prioritized as the geographic basis of its international power. Relevant Chi-nese and U.S. military units could also engage each other in cyberspace and in the infor-mation domains. Conventional military forces would continue their buildup and prepara-tions for major combat operations, though they would operate primarily as deterrent forces. Some conventional military interventions on the part of the PLA along China’s periphery, to fight U.S.-backed regimes or insurgencies, could be possible. War waged primarily through indirect means would open the possibility of cooperation and stabilization of bilateral rela-tions, in a manner somewhat evocative of how Soviet-U.S. relations stabilized despite the two nations waging indirect conflict against each other through proxy struggles around the world in the later decades of the Cold War. If the combatants successfully avoided escalation and maintained the conflict at a low level, trade and investment might flourish, resulting in a long-lasting, chronic state of semistable, bilateral ties and indirect war. But the risk of unintended escalation would remain substantial, since either side could tire of the indecisive stalemate and risk more aggressive actions to seize a major advantage.

　　总之，我们认为美中低烈度战争是一种长期存在的可能，其特点是代理人冲突，并可能直接涉及世界大部分地区。这些冲突主要由客户国或支持的反叛组织军队以及准军事和国防承包商进行，这些冲突可能是国内冲突的一部分，也可能是国家间冲突的一部分。解放军的参与主要包括为这些作战部队提供支持，并采取情报、侦察和监视与远程火力支援的形式。这些冲突最有可能发生在一带一路沿线，而中国已将这些路线作为其国际力量的地理基础。中国和美国的相关军事部队还可能在网络空间和信息领域相互交战。常规军事力量将继续集结并为大规模作战行动做准备，但它们将主要作为威慑力量运作。中国人民解放军有可能在中国周边地区进行一些常规军事干预，以打击美国支持的政权或叛乱活动。主要通过间接手段发动的战争将为双边关系的合作与稳定提供可能性，这种方式有点像冷战后期的几十年里，尽管苏美两国通过在世界各地的代理人斗争相互发动间接冲突，但两国关系却得以稳定。如果交战双方成功地避免了冲突升级，并将冲突维持在较低水平，贸易和投资可能会蓬勃发展，从而形成长期、半稳定的双边关系和间接战争状态。但是，意外升级的风险仍然很大，因为任何一方都可能厌倦优柔寡断的僵局，冒险采取更具侵略性的行动来夺取重大胜利优势。

　　The low-intensity nature of such conflicts also raises the possibility that different conflicts could emerge simultaneously in different parts of the world. Beijing and Washington could find themselves simultaneously managing a diverse set of intrastate and interstate conflicts that flare up now and then in different parts of the world. Moreover, the intensification of hostilities could overlap with those of rival countries in different regions, as well as with secu-rity challenges associated with shortages of water and food or nontraditional threats such as natural disasters and terrorist groups. Given the fragmentation, disorder, and pervasive-ness of transnational threats assumed in this scenario, there could be many opportunities for China to exploit state weakness to harm U.S.-aligned governments and groups. In such an environment, embattled states and groups could solicit Chinese or U.S. support for their own purposes. Both China and the United States could be challenged to balance their war efforts against each other, with security demands raised by their respective partner nations and/or various transnational threats. Much of the conflict could take the form of oppor-tunistic operations to exploit the difficulties of partner states aligned with one side or the other through the provision of low cost weaponry and equipment to supportive groups or governments.

　　此类冲突的低烈度性质意味着在世界不同地区同时出现不同冲突的可能——北京和华盛顿可能会发现自己同时在处理全球不同地区时不时爆发的各种国内和国家间冲突。此外，敌对行动的加剧可能与不同地区敌对国家的敌对行动重叠，也可能与缺水、缺粮或自然灾害和恐怖组织等非传统威胁相关的安全挑战重叠。考虑到这种情景中假定的分裂、无序和跨国威胁的普遍性，中国可能有很多机会利用有关国家的弱点来伤害与美国结盟的政府和团体。在这种环境下，陷入困境的国家和组织可能会出于自身目的寻求中国或美国的支持。中国和美国都可能面临挑战，要在各自的伙伴国或各种跨国威胁提出的安全要求下平衡彼此的战争努力。大部分冲突可能采取机会主义行动的形式，通过向支持团体或政府提供低成本武器装备，利用与一方结盟的伙伴国的困难等。

　　Beyond the force development and employment possibilities discussed herein, the method by which the PLA would fight in a low-intensity conflict would also depend on the geo-graphic location, the specific Chinese threat perception or interests involved, and the capa-bilities that the United States and its client states bring to bear. Some of these considerations would likely be as follows:

　　Along China’s periphery (Central, East, and Southeast Asia), Beijing could consider a range of conventional combat interventions against U.S.-backed governments or rebel groups. The most elite PLA units could take part in conventional assaults against neigh-boring states with hostile regimes or menacing insurgencies backed by the United States. China could also seek greater access for ships and aircraft in client states such as Cam-bodia and possibly press Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, and others for similar access and to deny the United States military access. Beijing might similarly lean on Manila to permit small detachments of Chinese ground troops to assist with domestic secu-rity missions, establish surveillance and intelligence collection networks, and ensure denial of U.S. access. Regarding Taiwan and maritime disputes, China could intensify gray zone operations against the militaries of nations with either an explicit or implied security partnership with the United States, to include more aggressive tactics such as arrests, seizures, ramming, and armed clashes at sea.

　　Chinese forces could also launch punitive missile strikes and other smaller-scale offensive operations to demonstrate the weaknesses of Taiwan’s defense and the limits of U.S. security assistance. Although Bei-jing might seek to avoid escalating such a situation into a broader conflict, such volatile situations could carry a high risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation.

　　除了本文讨论的军力发展和使用可能性外，解放军在低烈度冲突中的作战方法还取决于地理位置、中国的具体威胁感或相关利益，以及美国及其客户国的能力。其中一些考虑因素可能如下：

　　在中国周边地区（中亚、东亚和东南亚），中国政府可以考虑对美国支持的政府或叛乱组织进行一系列常规作战干预。中国人民解放军最精锐的部队可以参加对美国支持的国家敌对政权或来势汹汹的叛乱团体的常规攻击。

　　中国还可向柬埔寨等客户国的船只和飞机争取更多的准入权，并可能向孟加拉国、缅甸、泰国和其他国家施压，以争取类似的准入权，并拒绝美国军队进入。中国政府可能同样会向马尼拉施压，要求其允许中国地面部队派遣小分队协助国内安全任务，建立监视和情报收集网络，并确保拒绝美国进入。关于台湾和海洋争端，中国可能会加强针对与美国有明确或隐含安全伙伴关系的国家军队的灰色地带行动，包括更激进的策略，如逮捕、扣押、冲撞和海上武装冲突。中国军队还可能发动惩罚性导弹袭击和其他较小规模的进攻行动，以显示台湾防御的弱点和美国安全援助的局限性。尽管中国政府可能会努力避免这种局势升级为更大范围的冲突，但这种动荡局势极有可能导致误判和意外升级。

　　Outside China’s immediate periphery, in areas such as the Indian Ocean, South Asia, and West Africa, the most likely form of low-intensity conflict could consist of oppor-tunistic operations that exploited state fragmentation and disorder to harm the interests of U.S.-aligned governments and groups and bolster supporters of Chinese power. In occasional cases, China could organize small coalitions of forces to carry out various military operations. Chinese military officials could oversee the transfer of arms and equipment and provide training, technical expertise, and limited specialized military support in the form of reconnaissance and cyberoperations. Host nation militaries and rebel groups carrying Chinese weapons and equipment that fought neighbors or groups backed by the United States could be expected to bear the brunt of fighting. China could deploy smaller combat formations, including modest combined air and ground forces, to intervene directly in support of a client state or to attack U.S.-backed forces. Escala-tion of Chinese-Indian tensions could result in clashes at sea involving advanced naval warships or skirmishing on the borders.

　　在中国周边以外的地区，如印度洋、南亚和西非，最有可能发生的低烈度冲突形式可能是利用国家分裂和混乱来损害与美国结盟的政府和团体的利益并支持中国力量的机会主义行动。在偶尔的情况下，中国可以组织小型部队联盟开展各种军事行动。中国军官可以监督武器装备的转让，并提供培训、技术知识包括以侦察和网络行动为形式的有限的专业军事支持。与邻国或美国支持的团体交战的东道国军队和携带中国武器装备的叛乱团体可能首当其冲。中国可能会部署规模较小的作战编队，包括规模不大的空地联合部队，直接介入以支持某个客户国或攻击美国支持的部队。中印紧张局势的升级可能导致先进海军战舰的海上冲突或边境小规模冲突。

　　In more distant locations such as Africa and the Middle East, Europe, Latin America, and the polar regions, China’s options for waging low-intensity conflict would be more constrained by its limited access and power projection capability. The primary means of fighting in these areas would probably consist of operations that exploited the inter-state and intrastate conflicts that already existed to advance Chinese goals and harm the interests of the United States. China could provide military assistance and support to client nations or nonstate actors that fought for their own goals against neighbors and nonstate actors that happened to have some form of U.S. backing. Chinese specialized troops could provide ISR and possibly fire support with manned or unmanned systems.

　　在非洲、中东、欧洲、拉美和极地等更遥远的地区，中国发动低烈度冲突的选择将因其有限的进入和力量投射能力而受到更多限制。在这些地区作战的主要手段很可能是利用已经存在的国家间和国家内冲突来推进中国的目标和损害美国的利益。

　　中国可以向客户国或非国家行为体提供军事援助和支持，这些国家或行为体为了自己的目标与碰巧得到美国某种形式支持的邻国和非国家行为体作战。中国的特种部队可以提供情侦监系统，还可能利用有人或无人系统提供火力支援。

　　In these overseas locations China would likely prioritize missions based on the impor-tance of national interests involved. For example, the importance of the transit lane along the Indian Ocean for Chinese energy supplies and merchant shipping provides a strong incentive for the PLA to step up its ability to protect passing ships and deter pos-sible attacks. It could expand access for PLA Navy ships in Iran and for surface warships and submarines in Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Augmenting the gray hulls, China could send troops and equipment on civilian vessels carrying passengers or rely on armed civilian contractors to convey materiel to PLA bases or client militaries. The net result could be a more continuous and larger Chinese military and paramilitary presence along the Indian Ocean and in the Persian Gulf. Chinese naval and armed merchant ships could step up their presence in the Arctic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea to defend shipping traffic. In a scenario of low-intensity war, China might also be willing to become a more active supporter of Russia in confrontations with NATO countries and the United States.

　　在这些海外地区，中国可能会根据相关国家利益的重要性来确定执行任务的优先次序。例如，印度洋沿岸的过境航道对中国能源供应和商船运输的重要性为解放军加强保护过往船只和阻止可能的袭击提供了强大的动力。这可以扩大中国人民解放军海军舰艇在伊朗的通行范围，以及水面战舰和潜艇在巴基斯坦和斯里兰卡的通行范围。除灰色船体外，中国还可派遣部队和装备搭乘载客的民用船只，或依靠武装民用承包商向解放军基地或客户军队运送物资。最终结果可能是，中国在印度洋沿岸和波斯湾地区的军事和准军事存在更加持续、规模更大。中国海军和武装商船可能会加强在北冰洋和地中海的存在，以保卫航运交通。在低烈度战争的情况下，中国也可能愿意在与北约国家和美国的对抗中成为俄罗斯更积极的支持者。

　　In any location China could use information operations and outer space and cyber-space capabilities to gather intelligence, harvest data, incite domestic instability and political opposition to the United States, and garner support for Chinese leadership. The information domain could see the most aggressive activity due to the lower risk

　　of escalation. Chinese operatives could promote disinformation aimed at fomenting U.S. political division and unrest, but they would also be expected to defend against similar attacks from the United States within China. In cyberspace, Chinese cybersecu-rity units could escalate their espionage and reconnaissance activities to include modest attacks on U.S. networks, most likely by working through proxies in other countries to provide plausible deniability. Chinese forces would favor long-range strikes for direct attacks on U.S.-backed forces, either in support of client militaries or in PLA-led attacks against hostile forces along China’s periphery. Fear of unrestrained escalation and the concomitant collateral damage to infrastructure, finance, and the economy could deter China from pursuing more destructive cyberattacks on the United States in a scenario of low-intensity conflict.

　　在任何地方，中国都可以利用信息行动、外层空间和网络空间能力来收集情报、获取数据、煽动有关国家国内不稳定和对美国的政治反对，并为中国领导层争取支持。信息领域的活动可能最为激进，因为其升级风险较低。中国特工可能会散布旨在煽动美国政治分裂和动乱的假消息，但他们也会在中国国内抵御来自美国的类似攻击。在网络空间，中国的网络安全部队可能会将间谍和侦察活动升级，包括对美国网络的小规模攻击，最有可能的方式是通过其他国家的代理人来提供似是而非的推诿。中国军队将倾向于远程打击，直接攻击美国支持的军队，无论是支持其客户军队，还是在解放军领导下攻击中国周边的敌对势力。由于担心无节制的升级以及随之而来的对基础设施、金融和经济的附带损害，中国可能会在低烈度冲突的情况下不敢对美国发动更具破坏性的网络攻击。

　　While indirect war offers the advantage to Beijing of fighting a conflict at low cost, the downside is that the damage against U.S. power might also be fairly modest. The result could be a long-lasting, chronic state of indirect hostilities. The war could last even longer if accompanied by relatively stable U.S.-China ties and the continuation of trade relations, which would enable both sides to replenish resources lost through indirect conflict. Break-ing U.S. power in a manner that avoids catastrophic major war could be essential to Beijing’s goals in this scenario, but achieving that outcome could prove elusive or illusory. After years of inconclusive fighting, China could scale back some of its war aims so as to focus merely on gaining positional advantage in a few priority countries—most likely in the vital shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean and into Africa and the Middle East.

　　虽然间接战争为中国政府提供了以低成本对抗冲突的优势，但其缺点是对美国实力的损害可能也相当有限。结果可能是长期、慢性的间接敌对状态。如果中美关系相对稳定，贸易关系持续发展，双方都能补充间接冲突中损失的资源，那么对抗持续的时间可能会更长。在这种情况下，以避免灾难性大规模战争的方式削弱美国的力量对中国政府的目标可能至关重要，但实现这一结果可能会被证明是渺茫或虚幻的。经过多年无果而终的战斗，中国可能会缩减部分战争目标，从而只专注于在少数几个优先国家——最有可能是印度洋、非洲和中东的重要航道——获得位置优势。

　　To decide systemic leadership, Chinese leaders could prefer to wage a low-intensity war over a high-intensity war for several reasons. Most obviously, the level of destruction would probably be much lower, as would the overall risk of nuclear annihilation or catastrophic devastation. Moreover, a low-intensity war would make China’s vulnerabilities in power pro-jection less of a liability, since China would have less reason to fear U.S. military attacks on its distantly deployed ships.

　　要决定系统性的领导权，中国领导人可能出于几个原因更愿意发动低烈度战争而不是高烈度战争。最明显的是，破坏程度可能会低得多，核毁灭或灾难性破坏的总体风险也会低得多。此外，低烈度战争将减少中国在力量投射方面的弱点，因为中国显然不会多虑担心美国对其远距离部署的舰船发动军事攻击。

　　The pressure to demonstrate Chinese prowess on the battlefield in symmetrical fights with U.S. joint forces would also be lower. The PLA could instead aim to demonstrate its superiority by destroying high-profile U.S. weapon systems and platforms, primarily through sabotage or attacks launched by client militaries while the PLA husbanded its own advanced weapon systems.

　　在与美军联合部队的对称战斗中展示中国战场实力的压力也会降低。相反，解放军可以通过摧毁先进性领先全球的美国武器系统和平台来展示自己的战力——主要是通过破坏或由客户军队发起的攻击，而解放军则保留自己的先进武器系统。

　　If the conflict could be managed, China might also be able to maintain a semblance of trade and investment with many of its BRI partners and con-tinue to implement many aspects of its peacetime efforts to consolidate its leadership. The ability to replenish losses could prove critical to either side’s effort to prevail in a long-term low-intensity war. The fundamental strategic logic on both sides could center on attri-tion of the adversary to the point that it yields owing to exhaustion.

　　如果冲突能够得到控制，中国或许还能与许多一带一路合作伙伴保持一定的贸易和投资关系，并继续实施其和平时期巩固领导地位的诸多努力。在长期低烈度战争中，补充损失的能力对于任何一方取得胜利都至关重要。双方的基本战略逻辑可能都集中在打击对手上，最后，总会有一方因为精疲力竭而屈服。

　　Finding ways to impose costs that stress the adversary’s overburdened military resources, in addition to economic strategies aimed at constraining the other side, could prove key to prevailing. Of course, the losing side might also become desperate and opt for escalation to high-intensity war (dis-cussed in Chapter Seven) as a high-risk way to avoid defeat.

　　除了旨在限制对方的经济战略外，想方设法让对手不堪重负的军事资源付出代价，可能是获胜的关键。当然，失败的一方也可能会变得绝望，选择升级为高烈度战争（第七章将讨论）作为避免失败的高风险方法。